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ing the importance of channeling the sentencer's discretion so as to
minimize the "risk that 'the death penalty [may have been] meted out
arbitrarily or capriciously' or through 'whim... or mistake.' 59 Based
upon such principles, defense counsel in Virginia should argue that a
defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce evidence of his
or her parole ineligibility- regardless of whether the Commonwealth
argues future dangerousness- in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty is imposed on the basis of juror misconceptions about
parole law.
In concurring with the plurality's decision in Simmons that the
defendant was entitled to present evidence of his or her parole ineligibil-
ity, Justice Souter wrote separately to emphasize his belief that such an
outcome was also mandated by the Eighth Amendment because it
requires a heightened standard of reliability in capital cases. As part of
this heightened standard, jurors must fully comprehend their sentencing
options. However, as recognized by the plurality in Simmons, most juries
lack accurate information about the precise meaning of a sentence of life
imprisonment, and many surveys support the notion that there is a
reasonable likelihood of juror confusion about the meaning of a "life"
sentence.60 Most importantly, the studies demonstrate that potential
jurors often believe that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment will
be in prison for a much shorter period of time than is actually the case.
61
Furthermore, the studies reveal that parole eligibility and the likely
period of incarceration are key factors for jurors in determining a
sentence.
62
The Supreme Court has emphasized that reliability is a requirement
which compels the court to err on the side of giving the jury more
information rather than less.63 Furthermore, the requirement of reliabil-
be vacated if the jurors erroneously believed that, in order to give a
mitigating factor any weight, they had to agree unanimously on the
existence of the factor); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding
that a death sentence cannot stand if the jury was misled to believe that
it had no alternative but to convict the defendant of capital murder
although the evidence might have supported a conviction for the lesser
included offense of felony-murder).
59 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,343 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
60 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 169, 170. See supra notes 5-7 and
accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
62Id.
63 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983).
ity in sentencing has provided the foundation upon which the Court has
structured the right to introduce all relevant evidence in mitigation.64 In
order to satisfy the constitutional mandate of reliability in the capital
sentencing decision, defense counsel should therefore argue that the
defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce evidence of his
or her parole ineligibility to the jury- regardless of whether the
Commonwealth argues future dangerousness as a predicate to the death
sentence. Allowing jurors to operate under their misconceptions and
misinformation onparole in assessing the appropriate punishment of life
or death offers no reliability in sentencing and as such is in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.
VI. Conclusion
The Virginia legislature abolished parole for those convicted of
capital murder two years ago. However, when defense counsel does not
seek the introduction of parole ineligibility evidence or an instruction
regarding parole ineligibility, and when the Commonwealth does not
argue future dangerousness, Virginia judges continue to instruct sentenc-
ing juries that their choice is between "life" and "death," not between
"life without the possibility of parole" and "death." Given the probabil-
ity that most potential Virginia jurors continue to labor under the
misconception that a life sentence does not mean "life" imprisonment, it
is imperative that defense counsel insist upon the introduction of parole
ineligibility evidence in the sentencing phase of any capital trial, regard-
less of which aggravating factor(s) are argued by the Commonwealth.
Given the common sense emphasis that jurors place upon the length of
the defendant's probable incarceration, any evidence that the defendant
will never be released from prison could, quite literally, mean the
difference between alife sentence and a death sentence for the defendant.
64 See, e.g., Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05. In holding that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer be allowed to
consider all relevant mitigating evidence, the Court reviewed the hold-
ings in Furman and Woodson, stating "[wle are satisfied that this
qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a
greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed." Id. at
604.
RESURRECTING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN VIRGINIA
BY: JOSEPH D. PLATANIA
I. Introduction
Frequently, in capital murder trials, the Commonwealth attempts to
introduce codefendant's statements that inculpate the defendant as the
triggerman. Virginia trial courts sometimes find this evidence admis-
sible under the against interest exception to the hearsay rule, arguably
violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and
cross-examination. This article examines whatthe Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment provides, how it is affected by hearsay excep-
tions, and where its future lies as a constitutional doctrine. Although
courts do not necessarily apply the language of the Confrontation Clause
literally, it still affords significant protections to defendants who know
how to utilize it properly.
II. The Confrontation Clause: What It Is
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... be confronted
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with the witnesses against him."1 The Confrontation Clause is such an
important fundamental right that the United States Supreme Court has
recognized its applicability to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 In addition, the Court has generally construed the Confrontation
Clause to include the right to cross-examine witnesses in the presence of
the fact finder.3 In order to provide a criminal defendant with a fair trial,
it is vital that counsel be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
adverse witnesses so that the veracity of their statements may be tested.4
"The word 'confront,' after all .... means a clashing of forces or ideas,
thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness." 5 The United States
Supreme Court has described cross-examination as "the 'greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."'
6
Confrontation promotes reliability and trustworthiness at trials in
several different ways. Witnesses must be physically present and give
their statements under oath during the course of a formal judicial
proceeding. This formality, along with the possibility of a pejury
prosecution, impresses upon testifying individuals the importance and
seriousness of the matter. In addition, witness confrontation allows the
jury to better assess credibility by observing the testifying witness'
demeanor as he or she makes the statement. 7 Itis much more difficult to
tell an untruth about a person in their presence. 8 The importance of
confrontation and the policies it furthers are not just reflected in federal
authority, however. The Virginia Constitution guarantees "[t]hat in
criminal prosecutions a man hath a right.., to be confronted with the
accusers and witnesses."
9
Oftentimes the Confrontation Clause is implicated by the introduc-
tion of codefendant statements. The United States Supreme Court has
found the Confrontation Clause violated when a codefendant's confes-
sion implicated the accused and was introduced at trial. In Douglas v.
Alabama,1 0 the defendant, Douglas, and an alleged accomplice were
charged with and tried separately for assault with intent to murder. The
alleged accomplice, Loyd, had confessed and named Douglas as the
individual who had fired the gun and injured the victim. At Loyd's trial,
which occurred first, he was found guilty. At Douglas' trial, the State
called Loyd as a witness. Loyd was appealing his conviction and,
therefore, when questioned, invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The trial judge allowed the prosecutor to treat
Loyd as hostile and, "[u]nder the guise of '11 refreshing Loyd's recollec-
tion, in front of the jury, read from his confession which directly
implicated Douglas. The statement was marked as an exhibit but never
offered into evidence. The jury found Douglas guilty.
12
The United States Supreme Court held that Douglas' Sixth Amend-
ment right of confrontation was denied because he was unable to cross-
examine Loyd regarding the alleged confession. The Court further held
that Douglas' opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement officers
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965), citing Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965).
3 Pointer, 380 U.S. at404. But see NewMexico v. Earnest477 U.S.
648,649-50 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (the Confrontation Clause
no longer requires an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the
admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement).
4 1d.
5 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
6 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970), quoting 5 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
7 Id. at 158.
8 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 846.
9 Va. Const. art. I § 8 (1971).
10 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
11 Id. at 416.
12 Id. at 416-17.
that witnessed the confession was insufficient to remedy the constitu-
tional violation.
13
Similarly, the Court found a violation of the Confrontation Clause
in Bruton v. United States.14 Bruton involved a joint trial of codefen-
dants Bruton and Evans for armed postal robbery. During its case-in-
chief, the State called a postal inspector who testified that Evans had
orally admitted that he and Bruton had committed the armed robbery.
Evans never took the stand, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination. The jury was instructed by the trial judge that
although Evans' confession was admissible against Evans, it was inad-
missible hearsay against Bruton and was to be disregarded in determin-
ing his guilt or innocence. Both were convicted and appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. That court ruled that
Evans' confession was not admissible evidence against him and set aside
his conviction. The court then affirmed Bruton's conviction because it
found that the jury had been properly instructed to disregard the confes-
sion when it determined his guilt or innocence.
15
The United States Supreme Court held that the admission, at ajoint
trial, of an unavailable codefendant's confession implicating the other
codefendant, violates the right of confrontation that is secured by the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 16 Especially troublesome to the Court was the risk of
prejudice to Bruton. By introducing Evans' confession that inculpated
Bruton, the State's case was given "substantial, perhaps even critical,
weight.., in a form not subject to cross-examination." 17 The Court
found this to be constitutionally impermissible. Besides finding an
uncrossable confession of a non-testifying codefendant prejudicial, the
Court implicitly held that such evidence may be presumptively unreli-
able and incredible. Testifying accomplices generally have a motive to
shift the blame from themselves. 18 The danger is magnified when an
accomplice does not take the stand and his or her statements are not
subjected to cross-examination. 19 "It was against such threats to a fair
trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed."
20
The United States Supreme Court slightly modified the application
of Bruton in Richardson v. Marsh.2 1 In Richardson, the Court held that
the constitutional rule set forth in Bruton is satisfied if, along with a
proper limiting instruction,2 2 the nontestifying codefendant's confes-
sion is redacted to eliminate any reference to the defendant's existence.
23
In a more recent decision, Williamson v. United States,2 4 the Court
interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (b)(3), the statement against
interest hearsay exception, to not allow the "admission of non-self-
inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative
that is generally self-inculpatory." 25 Unfortunately for Virginia defense
counsel, the Court grounded their ruling on the Federal Rules of Evi-
13 Id. at 419-420.
14 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
15 Id. at 123-125.
16 Id. at 137.
17 Id. at 128.
18 In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,541 (1986), the Court stated that
"[o]ver the years since Douglas, the Court has spoken with one voice in
declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that in-
criminate defendants."
19 391 U.S. at 136.
20 Id., citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
21 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
22 The Court found an instruction admonishing the jury not to use
the confession in any way against the defendant as properly limiting.
Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211.
23 Id.
24 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
25 Id. at 600-01.
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dence rather than the United States Constitution. States are not obligated
to follow the Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Notwithstanding these variations, Bruton's basic holding was re-
cently reaffirmed. In Cruz v. New York,26 the United States Supreme
Court consideredwhetherBruton applied to acasein which a nontestifying
codefendant's confession that inculpated the defendant, but was not
directly admissible against the defendant, was introduced. In Cruz,
defendant and codefendant were tried jointly for the felony murder of a
gas station attendant. The codefendant had confessed on videotape to
shooting the attendant but did not testify at trial. The trial court allowed
the State to introduce the confession against the codefendant only.
Although both defendants had the same jury, the jury was instructed that
the confession was to be used against the codefendant, but not the
defendant. The State also called a witness who testified that the
defendant had admitted to attempting to rob the gas station and to being
present when the codefendant shot and killed the attendant. 27
The United States Supreme Court upheld the basic command of
Bruton and found that at a joint trial, the Confrontation Clause bars
admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that incriminates
the defendant and is not directly admissible against the defendant, even
if the defendant's own confession is admitted against him.28 In a joint
trial of two or more defendants, "the pretrial confession of one of them
that implicates the others is not admissible against the others unless the
confessing defendant waives his Fifth Amendment rights so as to permit
cross-examination." 29
In sum, Douglas and Bruton are still good law. Douglas stands for
the proposition that if a defendant is unable to confront and cross-
examine a declarant regarding the declarant's alleged confession that
incriminates defendant, the confession violates the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause and is inadmissible. 30 If the defendant is being
tried at a joint trial, Bruton instructs the trial judge to exclude an
unavailable codefendant's confession that implicates the defendant. If
the trial is nonjoint, but the confession implicates the defendant and the
declarant is unavailable, counsel should argue that Bruton's policy
objectives and concerns still apply with full and equal force. Richardson
modified Bruton and deemed admissible a confession of a nontestifying
codefendant, but only with redaction and a proper limiting instruction.
Williamson augmented Bruton on Federal Rules' grounds by finding
non-self-inculpatory portions of a confession inadmissible.
On motions and on appellate review of cases involving confronta-
tion issues, defense counsel should cite all of these cases and their
holdings. Counsel should assert the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
criminal defendants of the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses, and should argue that the admission into evidence of any
confession by an unavailable codefendant violates the Confrontation
Clause.
El. The Confrontation Clause: What It Isn't
What happens when the Commonwealth wants to introduce the
confession of a nontestifying codefendant at trial under a state exception
to the hearsay rule over a defense objection on Confrontation Clause
26 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
27 Id. at 188-189.
28 Id. at 193.
29 Id. at 190.
30 Notably, inDouglas, the written confession was not admitted into
evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, it was admitted
under the guise of refreshing recollection when the declarant invoked his
Fifth Amendment rights. Although not technically testimony, the Court
treated the Solicitor's reading of the confession as the equivalent in the
jury's mind of testimony. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,416-417,
419 (1965).
grounds? The United States Supreme Court has attempted to answer this
question through a series of five cases, but portions of their decisions are
vague and unclear. The Court seems to make broad constitutional
pronouncements without considering the effects on the application of the
Confrontation Clause. As aresult, much roomforargument and analysis
remains. What follows is a brief summary of the cases and how Virginia
defense attorneys can most effectively interpret them.
The summary begins with Ohio v. Roberts.31 In that case the Court
noted that the Confrontation Clause was clearly meant to exclude at least
some hearsay evidence32 The Court stated that the Clause "reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,"'33 and that '"[a]
primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examina-
tion.' 34 In Roberts, the Court found that the Confrontation Clause
limited admissible hearsay in two different ways. The first limiting
principle is unavailability of the declarant. The State has the burden of
either producing the declarant whose statement it wishes to use or
demonstrating the declarant's unavailability. 35 A court cannot find a
witness unavailable for purposes of the Sixth Amendment unless the
State has made a good faith effort to locate the individual prior to trial.
36
What constitutes a good faith effort must be determined on a case by case
basis as there is no bright line test. Defense counsel should be aware that
theprosecution bears the burden ofestablishing good faith.37 IftheState
cannot meet its burden, Roberts held that the constitutional command of
the Sixth Amendment has been violated and the evidence must be
excluded.
Once the first hurdle has been surmounted, the State must then
satisfy the court that the hearsay statement is trustworthy and bears
adequate indicia of reliability. 38 The Court broadened the test in favor
of the prosecution by adding that "[rieliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception." 39 The reliability requirement can also be met by showing
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 40 To satisfy this require-
ment, the court must find that the evidence is "so trustworthy that
adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. '4 1 Virginia defense
counsel should be aware that the Roberts Court found that the mere
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the preliminary hearing,
even when no actual cross took place, satisfied the Confrontation
Clause. 42 Thus, counsel should beware of a codefendant who testifies at
a preliminary hearing, but who later may decide to invoke Fifth Amend-
ment rights.
The two step analysis of unavailability and reliability set forth in
Roberts was altered by three subsequent United States Supreme Court
cases. In United States v. Inadi,4 3 the Court held thatRoberts was a very
narrow decision. While the unavailability rule applied inRoberts, which
dealt with former testimony, it did not necessarily apply to every other
hearsay exception. Inadi dealt with coconspirator statements which,
31 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
32 Id. at 63.
33 Id.
34 Id. quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)
(alteration in original).
35 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
36 Id. at74.
37 Id. at 75.
3 8 1d. at 65-66.
39 Roberts, 448 U.S. at66, quotingMancusiv. Stubbs,408 U.S. 204,
213 (1972).
40 Id.
41 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990).
42 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,70 (1980).
43 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
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under the Federal Rules, are not hearsay.44 The Court held that the
Confrontation Clause did not require the State to prove declarant's
unavailability as a condition of admissibility when the out of court
statement was made by a nontestifying coconspirator.
45 It is important
to note the narrow scope of the Court's actual holding though. Inadi only
abolished the unavailability analysis for Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) cases involving nonhearsay statements by coconspirators.
Unavailability was NOT explicitly removed as a condition for admissi-
bility in other instances.
In Bourjaily v. United States,4 6 the Court held that an inquiry into
reliability is not constitutionally mandated where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 47 The Court went on to hold
that Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E) was a firmly rooted rule
48
and courts need not inquire into the reliability of such evidence.
49
Making Bourjaily less clear is the fact that the Court has not defined
firmlyrooted. Inits decision, the Court seemedto look to therather vague
and ambiguous principles of tradition and established precedent.
50
Again, Virginia defense counsel should recognize the limited scope of
Bourjaily: only Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E) was found to be
firmly rooted.
The Court adhered to Robert's two part unavailability/reliability
analysis in Idaho v. Wright.51 In Wright, the Court found a state residual
hearsay exception not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause pur-
poses. 52 Since the State could not establish that the statement fit under
a firmly rooted exception, itneeded to demonstrate that the statement was
supported by particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The Court
held that the State had failed, and that the hearsay evidence was barred
by the Confrontation Clause.53 Wright is an important case for defense
counsel because it stands for the proposition that not all state hearsay
exceptions are firmlyrooted for Confrontation Clause purposes. Since
there is no definitive "firmly rooted" test, most state hearsay exceptions
are still fair game for argument.
In White v. Illinois,54 the Court relied on Inadi to severely narrow
the unavailability analysis adhered to in Idaho v. Wright.55 The Court
44 Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E) provides that "a state-
ment is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy."
45 lnadi 475 U.S. at 400.
46 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
47 Id. 182-183.
48 Although the Court spoke in terms of "the coconspirator excep-
tion to the hearsay rule," under the Federal Rules, statements by co-
conspirators are not hearsay.
49 Bourjaily 483 U.S. at 183.
50 1d.
51 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
52 Id. at 817. Idaho's residual hearsay exception provides in
relevant part that:
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. Idaho R. Evid.
803(24).
53 Id. at 827.
54 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
55 In White, the Court presumed unavailability based on the trial
confinedRobertsto its facts holding that "unavailability... is a necessary
part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry" when the hearsay statements
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.56 The Court then
analyzed the statement's reliability and reaffirmed its earlier rulings that
held "where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to
come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confron-
tation Clause is satisfied."
'57
IV. The Confrontation Clause: What It Should Be
The purpose of this section is to set forth the steps Virginia defense
counsel should follow when, under the against interest exception to the
hearsay rule, the Commonwealth attempts to admit statements by a
codefendant inculpating the defendant. It is vital that defense counsel be
able to properly identify, articulate, and preserve this crucial pretrial
admissibility issue. This analysis only applies in cases in which a capital
defendant has one or more codefendants and when the Commonwealth
seeks to introduce codefendant statements, inculpating the defendant,
under the against interest exception.
First, counsel should argue that in Virginia, the against interest
hearsay exception requires that the declarant be unavailable. "The
prerequisite of unavailability is firmly established in Virginia law."
'58 In
Chandler v. Commonwealth,59 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
"[t]o be an admissible declaration against penal interest, the statement
must ... be made by an unavailable declarant. ' ' 60 Thus, there is little
doubt, under Virginia state law, that if the Commonwealth cannot prove
the unavailability of the declarant, the statement is inadmissible at
defendant's trial and the inquiry ends.
A second inquiry, should the Commonwealth prove unavailabil-
ity,61 is whether the defendant is being tried jointly with an unavailable
codefendant. If so, Bruton mandates exclusion of the codefendant's
confession. While the Commonwealth may argue that Richardson
allows admission of the confession in redacted form with a limiting
instruction, counsel can argue that even redacted admission will preju-
dice the defendant.
court's finding which was not addressed by the appellate court.
56 502 U.S. at 354.
57 Id. at 356.
58 2 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia 128 (4th
ed. 1993).
59 249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219 (1995).
60 Id. at 279 n.1, 455 S.E.2d at 224 n.1.
61 Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides:
(a) Definition of unavailability. 'Unavailability as a wit-
ness' includes situations in which the declarant- (1) is
exemptedby ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement; or (2) persists in refusing to testify
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement
despite an order of the court to do so; or (3) testifies to a
lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death or then existing physical or
mental illness or infirmity; or (5) is absent from the
hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable
to procure the declarant's attendance.., by process or
other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as
a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrong-
doing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
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If there are separate trials, counsel should argue thatthe codefendant's
confession that inculpates the defendant does not fall under the Virginia
against interest hearsay exception. Virginia's against interest exception
to the hearsay rule was set forth inHines v. Commonwealth62 and further
refined in Ellison v. Commonwealth.63 In Ellison, the Virginia Supreme
Court held that declarations against penal interest are admissible at trial
only if the Commonwealth can prove that those declarations are reli-
able.64 Although the issue of reliability is left to the discretion of the trial
judge, "the crucial issue is whether the content of the confession is
trustworthy. ' 65 One of the determining factors of trustworthiness is
whether corroborating evidence, other than the confession, connects the
declarant to the alleged offense. 66 Therefore, in order to properly lay the
foundation for the exception, the prosecutor must offer more than just the
"bare bones" confession.
In a capital murder trial, a codefendant's pretrial statement that
implicates the defendant as the triggerman is inherently unreliable since,
in Virginia, only the triggerman can be tried capitally. Virginia Code
Section 18.2-18 states that "an accessory before the fact or principal in
the second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted
and punished as though the offense were murder in the first degree."
Therefore, confessions of codefendant's, ostensibly against their inter-
est, that implicate the defendant as the triggerman actually favor the
codefendant's penal interest. Such statements are wholly self-serving. A
codefendant that can successfully shift the blame for the actual killing to
another has insulated himself or herself not only from a sentence of death,
but also from ever being convicted of capital murder. Additionally, the
United States Supreme Court has declared that accomplices' confessions
that incriminate defendants are presumptively unreliable.67
If the trial judge nonetheless determines that the statement is
admissible hearsay, defense counsel must then raise the federal Confron-
tation Clause issue. Admitting non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
"made within a broader narrative that is generally self inculpatory," 68 is
a clear violation of the Confrontation Clause. This argument simply
couches the Williamson holding, which was based on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, in constitutional terms. The fact that Williamson was based
on the Federal Rules of Evidence rather than the United States Constitu-
tion does not diminish this argument. It simply illustrates the general
practice of the Court to avoid constitutional pronouncements when there
is a narrower ground for the ruling. Counsel should argue that the
Confrontation Clause requires the Williamson holding and that the
United States Supreme Court would have so ruled had the Federal Rules
of Evidence not provided a sufficient basis for the decision.
Once the Confrontation Clause is cited, the Commonwealth will
rely on the line of cases discussed in Part III of this article to argue that
they have proven unavailability and that Virginia case law establishes
that the against interest exception is firmly rooted. In addressing the
firmly rooted claim, counsel should point out that the United States
Supreme Court has never found the against interest exception to the
hearsay rule to be firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes. The
only exceptions to the hearsay rule that the Court has labeled as firmly
rooted are spontaneous declarations 69 and statements made for medical
treatment.70 Unfortunately, and hopefully incorrectly, inRaia v. Com-
62 136 Va. 728, 117 SE 843 (1923).
63 219 Va. 404,247 S.E.2d 685 (1978).
64 Id. at 408, 247 S.E.2d at 688.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 409, 247 S.E.2d at 688.
67 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986).
68 Williamson v. United States 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994).
69 White v. Illinois 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
70 Id. Note that the Court has also recognized Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 (d)(2)(E), which states that coconspirator statements are
not hearsay, as firmly rooted. The Court also found in Roberts that the
monwealth,7 1 the Virginia Court of Appeals recognized a statement
against interest of an unavailable witness as a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule.72 If the Commonwealth relies on this case, Virginia
defense counsel should object on Confrontation Clause grounds, suggest
that Raia was incorrectly decided, and argue that the against interest
exception is not firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes.
Since declarations against interest, particularly in a capital murder
proceeding, are inherently unreliable and untrustworthy, they should not
be considered as a firmly rooted hearsay exception for Confrontation
Clause purposes.
The Commonwealth will likely claim that White v. Illinois is
dispositive. White held that when proffered hearsay comes within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied.73 The Commonwealth will argue that since Virginia labeled
the against interest exception firmly rooted inRaia, the analysis ends and
the Confrontation Clause is satisfied.
As an initial response, Virginia defense counsel must argue that in
White the Court did not intend such a sweeping pronouncement. Abroad
interpretation of White would effectively eviscerate the Confrontation
Clause and admit all hearsay evidence that is tapped with a "firmly
rooted" label. Counsel must suggest that, regardless of what exceptions
a state labels as finrly rooted, the test of unavailability and reliability
should apply to every hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause
purposes except spontaneous declarations and statements for medical
treatment.
If this argument is not accepted by the trial court, counsel might
suggest that Wright supports the proposition that a state's decision about
which exceptions are firmly rooted is inconclusive for Confrontation
Clause purposes. What satisfies the Confrontation Clause is a federal
question and, therefore, the United States Supreme Court is the final
arbiter. There is no binding federal decision on whether the against
interest exception is firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes
and, therefore, the issue remains open for debate.
Defense counsel must conclude by arguing that a capital murder
trial is inherently unique from all other criminal proceedings. A sentence
of death "is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long .... Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." 74 As was
noted in Simmons v. South Carolina,75 the Eighth Amendment requires
"heightened reliability" in capital trials.76 In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court
stated that the Confrontation Clause clearly was meant to exclude some
hearsay evidence.77 At a capital murder trial, hearsay under the against
interest exception is just the type of unreliable and untrustworthy
evidence that Roberts was contemplating.
V. Conclusion
Someday, the Supreme Courtmay decide to reemphasize defendant's
constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination. If that day
does come, only in those cases where the issue was properly preserved
will defendants be able to petition for relief. Until then, Virginia defense
counsel must zealously litigate the admissibility of codefendant state-
ments under the against interest exception.
priortestimony involved in thatcase, while not necessarily firmly rooted,
bore sufficient indicia of reliability.
71 478 S.E.2d 328 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
72 1d. at 331.
73 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992).
74 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
75 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
76 Id at 172 (Souter, J., concurring).
77 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).

